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Foreword
This publication corresponds to the first chapter of the Economic Survey of Latin America
and the Caribbean, 2001-2002 and is being published simultaneously in English and Spanish.
It provides an assessment of the region’s economic performance during the first half of 2002
and of its prospects for the remainder of the year.  An analysis is presented of the main aspects
of the regional economy, including its external sector, macroeconomic policies, levels of
economic activity, inflation, employment, saving and investment.  A statistical appendix
consisting of 13 tables with data series up to 2001 is also furnished.
This document has been prepared by the Economic Development Division with the
collaboration of the Statistics and Economic Projections Division, the ECLAC subregional
headquarters in Mexico City and Port of Spain, and the ECLAC national offices in Argentina,
Brazil and Colombia.
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CURRENT CONDITIONS AND OUTLOOK, 2002
Introduction
Against the backdrop of a very sluggish international
economic environment, the reactivation that began in
Latin America and the Caribbean in 2000 was short lived.
After having stalled in 2001, economic growth is
expected to be negative (-0.8%) for 2002, and
unemployment is projected to reach a record of over
9%. The severe crisis in Argentina accounts for a great
deal of this downturn, however; the growth rates of the
rest of the economies in the region have also slackened,
but will nonetheless be positive in most cases.  In fact, if
Argentina is factored out of the totals, then a modest
expansion (slightly over 1%) of the region’s GDP is
projected.  Inflation has remained low in most of the
countries, with the rise in the regional indicator being
attributable to the effects of major devaluations in
Argentina and Venezuela.
Given the slow pace of the industrialized economies’
recovery and the still low prices being brought by the
region’s main commodity exports, its external sales of
goods are likely to decline by a further 1.5% in 2002.
The improvement in the regional trade balance is
primarily a reflection of plummeting import demand in
Argentina.  Flows of direct investment, which have been
the largest component in the region’s inflows of external
capital since the mid-1990s, will continue to dwindle,
and financial capital will remain scarce.  The terms and
conditions for external financing continue to be less
favourable than they were prior to the Asian crisis and,
as a result, the region is expected to register a net outward
transfer of resources for the fourth year running.
Unlike the crises that occurred in the 1990s, which
affected a limited group of countries, in 2001 the recession
engulfed all of the region’s economies.  This contractionary
climate remained in evidence during the first quarter of
2002, as is shown by the fact that regional GDP was 3%
lower than it had been in the first quarter of 2001 (see figure 1).
Thanks to a more flexible management of fiscal, exchange
and monetary policies in 2001 and 2002, however, most of
the countries have managed to avert a full-blown crisis.
These measures have, however, revealed just how little
manoeuvring room is available for domestic economic
policy.  Unlike the situation in the industrialized economies,
where a more expansionary monetary and fiscal policy
stance has been adopted in order to counter the recession,
the region’s governmental authorities have come under
increasing pressure to cut back spending in order to control
a public debt that has been inflated by a five-year-long
uptrend in the fiscal deficit.   Private firms also have less
breathing space, as several years of sagging profits have
undermined their capital base.  Despite the monetary
authorities’ efforts to expand the money supply and lower
interest rates, however, in most of the countries the private
sector’s supply and demand for domestic credit continues
to shrink.  The banking system in several of the
MERCOSUR countries has also become quite fragile as a
result of the crisis.
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Looking beyond the immediate situation, there
is concern about the possibility that the prevailing
economic climate in the region may become one of
low growth, worsening domestic conditions and bleak
prospects for the future.  Within this context, the words
“adverse expectations” reappear as a leitmotiv in
economic analyses,  and the fixed investment
coefficient has dropped to a 10-year low.  The
economic situation in 2002 clearly reveals the
disparity between the expectations awakened by the
new economic model that took hold in the region
during the 1990s and current growth prospects, thus
revealing the existence of a gap that is raising a series
of questions as to the economic and social
sustainability of existing development patterns.  As
has been seen in a number of cases, the protracted
economic recession, high unemployment and the
limitation of social expenditure are creating social
tensions that undermine domestic governance and
make it harder for national authorities to implement
needed economic reforms and policies.
Hopes for the start of an economic reactivation in
the region in the second half of 2002 are based on
projections of a definite upturn in the United States
economy and better economic conditions in Europe.  Any
improvement in the international environment ought to
be reflected first in the Mexican, Central American and
Caribbean economies, which have close trade relations
with the United States. However, as of June 2002, a
deterioration in the international financial situation and
market speculation against the Brazilian economy,
together with continuing uncertainty in neighbouring
Argentina, had again raised the spectre of financial
contagion of the entire region as well as of other
emerging economies.  Within this context, no more than
a moderate recovery of regional GDP is likely in 2003,
with projected growth of between 2.5% and 3% –enough
for a slight rise in per capita GDP, but not enough to
boost employment indicators.
The economy’s weak performance in 2002 fits in with
the stage of slow growth that began with the Asian crisis.
Although the different countries’ experiences cover a wide
spectrum, the ensuing economic slowdown has been
widespread, and per capita GDP has declined in a large
number of them.  As a result, 2002 will mark the fifth
“lost year” in a row, with per capita output slipping to a
level nearly 2% below where it stood in 1997.  Within
this context, the increasingly evident conflicts arising
between the external economic environment, domestic
macroeconomic policy, and economic and social
development processes pose a series of challenges for the
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Figure 1
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCTa
(Percentage variation with respect to the same quarter of previus year)
Source:  ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
a Includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.
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Thanks to more flexible exchange-rate regimes and
the adoption of macroeconomic policies based on
inflation targets, a number of the countries have
improved their macroeconomic policies since the mid-
1990s. In the realm of fiscal policy, however, further
progress needs to be made in correcting procyclical
biases, increasing tax revenues, improving taxation
structures and raising the quality of public expenditure.
Moreover, little headway has been made in implementing
reforms to promote more dynamic changes in production
patterns, whose materialization depends on a number
of other factors in addition to a strong macroeconomic
performance.  Even though public social spending has
been increased and steps have been taken to improve
the design of social policy, much remains to be done
before new patterns of development benefit the
population as a whole.
This situation underscores the importance of
building a new consensus based on global initiatives to
improve the developing countries’ position within the
world order and facilitate more active sorts of national
and regional development policies than most of those
implemented over the past decade.1 The decision taken
by the member countries of the World Trade
Organization when they met in Doha in November 2001
to launch a new “development round” and the United
Nations International Conference on Financing for
Development that was held in March 2002 in Monterrey,
Mexico, attest to the international community’s political
will to take more energetic steps to promote a
development agenda and reduce the asymmetries
spawned by globalization.  The fact remains, however,
that the deterioration in the international situation has
sparked a resurgence of protectionist trends in the
industrialized countries, and there is a disturbing
tendency to adopt a relatively passive attitude towards
severe financial crises such as the one currently affecting
Argentina.  Action at the regional level should play a
more central and strategic role in this respect, not only
because of the growing importance of intraregional  trade
in recent years, but also because the regional arena
appears to be the most promising forum for dialogue
and consensus-building regarding national policies to
meet the challenges posed by the external environment.
External conditions continue to trouble the region
In 2002, trends in international trade, the regionwide
effects of the serious economic crisis in Argentina and
the volatility of financial markets have combined to
generate an adverse external environment.  The current
account deficit on the regional balance of payments is
estimated at some US$ 40 billion for 2002 (2.2% of
GDP), and this comes on the heels of a US$ 51 billion
deficit in 2001 (see figure 2).  The decrease is chiefly
accounted for by a sharp reduction in the trade deficit,
which is in turn primarily attributable to the larger trade
surplus that will be posted by Argentina as a result of its
devaluation and recession.  The other economies will
run trade deficits once again, although they will be
smaller than before.  All in all, the trade deficit for
goods and non-factor services is expected to total some
US$ 5 billion.
In addition to this shortfall, net payments of profits
and interest will amount to approximately US$ 55 billion,
which is quite similar to the figure for 2001.  As in the
past few years, the region’s deficits on the trade and capital
income accounts will be partially offset by current
transfers, which in large part are made up of family
remittances.  Such remittances are expected to total around
US$ 20 billion in 2002, or 15% less than in 2001.
For the fourth consecutive year, total capital inflows
are unlikely to be enough to balance out the region’s
payments of profits and interest, and it will consequently
register a net outward transfer of resources once again.
A fundamental change has been observed in recent years
in the composition of private resource transfers, since
positive transfers to Latin America and the Caribbean
have consisted entirely of foreign direct investment
(FDI), whereas transfers of financial resources have been
markedly negative since 1999 (see figure 3). The
downturn in net FDI flows that appears to be in the
making for 2002 is therefore a cause of concern, since
these funds, together with emergency loans from
international financial institutions, were the only factor
that prevented net resource transfers from being starkly
negative in 1999-2001.
1 For further information on the global development agenda proposed by ECLAC, see Globalization and development, which was
presented at the twenty-ninth session of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (Brasilia, Brazil, 6-10 May
2002) (LC/G.2157(SES.29/3)), Santiago, Chile, April 2002.
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LATIN AMERICA AND THE  CARIBBEAN: CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE
(Percentages of GDP)
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Figure 3
LATIN AMERICA: NET TRANSFERS OF EXTERNAL RESOURCES, 1970-2002
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the International Monetary Fund.
a Preliminary estimates.
a
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The contractionary trend in foreign trade strengthens
In 2002, the impact on the region’s external trade flows
generated by the performance of the world economy
–whose slowdown in 2001 led to a contraction in the
region’s external trade– was compounded by the deep
economic crisis in Argentina.  These two determining
factors have thus combined to prolong the downward
trend in foreign trade.  In fact, if the region’s trade
performance for the first few months carries over into
the rest of the year, 2002 could end up being one of the
region’s worst years in decades.  If this occurs, both
sluggish export volumes and weak prices will be to
blame.
The downward trend in commodity prices appeared
to bottom out, in most instances, in late 2001, but no
clear turnaround has yet been seen that would permit
prices to regain the ground lost the year before.  In fact,
in the case of coffee, the upswing seen in the first quarter
of 2002 stalled in the second, and prices returned to the
weakening trend that had begun in late 1999 (see figure 4).
As a result, a comparison between the average prices
brought by the region’s main commodity exports in 2002
and 2001 reveals a general decline.  The categories of
products whose mean prices have fallen in the past year
–such as minerals and metals, petroleum and coffee–
continued to post declines in the first half of 2002,
although the decreases were smaller.  Average food
prices were down, after having risen in 2001, with the
exception of meat, whose international prices have
continued to climb, albeit more slowly.  Overall, the price
index for Latin American and Caribbean commodity
exports was 15% lower in the first semester of 2002 than
the average for 2001 (5% if petroleum is not included).
Figure 4
PRICE INDEXES OF LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN
NON-FUEL COMMODITY EXPORTS a
(Indices 1995=100)
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures
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This price trend is in keeping with the overall decline
in export values seen in the first quarter of 2002, which
reflects even sharper decreases (including double-digit
reductions in many cases) than those of 2001 (see figure 5).
Costa Rica was the only country that succeeded in halting
the downturn in its exports, which for the last two years
had been hurt by lower coffee prices and the critical
situation in the United States technology market. In the
services sector, the picture in the tourism industry, which
is of such great importance for many Caribbean
countries, was quite similar to that of merchandise
exports.  Tourist arrivals continued to dwindle in the early
months of 2002, with the reduction amounting, for
example, to 8% in Barbados.
Figure 5
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: MONTHLY GOODS TRADE  a
(Billions of dollars)
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
a Includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and
Venezuela, which together account for 93% of the region's trade.
Trends in raw material prices and, to a great extent,
in the value of Latin American and Caribbean exports
throughout the rest of the year will be strongly influenced
by the situation in the world economy and, in particular,
the United States.  This country’s economy exhibited a
strong upturn in the first quarter of 2002, but there is a
great deal of uncertainty as to how it and the other
developed economies will fare during the remainder of
the year.  A reactivation in the United States would be
of particularly crucial importance in reversing the
downward trend seen in Mexico’s, Central America’s
and the Caribbean countries’ exports in the first quarter.
Although it is reasonable to hope for an
improvement in the case of Mexico, the prospects for the
Southern Cone have been dimmed by the effects of the
Argentine crisis. The largest losses of export earnings in
the first quarter of 2002 were sustained by the
MERCOSUR countries, Chile and Ecuador.  In Argentina,
the decrease in external sales caused by lower international
prices and the turmoil in the country’s financial system
was checked by the steep devaluation of the peso.
The situation with respect to Argentina’s imports
was much more dramatic.  The contraction of this
country’s imports to around one third of their former
level was largely to blame for the downswing in the
exports of its neighbouring MERCOSUR partners.  This
was especially true of the smaller members (i.e.,
Paraguay and Uruguay), but Brazil, which sells almost
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The striking drop in Argentine imports
overshadowed the overall trend in the region, which has
also been moving downward, in some cases quite
sharply.  Bearing in mind the results for the first quarter
and the unfavourable trend of economic activity in the
countries of the region, the descent of the region’s
imports appears to be on its way towards doubling the
2.5% drop posted in 2001.
Apart from Argentina, the steepest decreases have
been registered by Uruguay (in keeping with the
economic recession in that country), Paraguay (where
both the economy in general and transit trade, in
particular, have exhibited a slight contraction) and Brazil
(where domestic economic activity has also been
flagging).  In all of these countries, the reductions have
amounted to 25% or more.  Smaller but still quite
sizeable declines have been recorded by all the Andean
countries except Ecuador.  In Mexico, the drop in imports
has been smaller (8% in the first quarter).  As was also
true the year before, in every case a portion of the
decrease in the value of imports has been due to lower
import prices. As in 2001, the conspicuous exception in
this regionwide import picture is Ecuador, where a real
appreciation of the currency has continued to help boost
imports, which jumped by 30% in the first four months
of the year.
Two major determinants of foreign trade activity
accounted for the mixed performance of intraregional
trade in the first quarter of 2002.  In the Central
American Common Market (CACM), the slowdown in
the United States economy caused exports to
destinations outside the subregion to fall much more
steeply than exports within the zone (26% versus 2%).
Just the opposite occurred in MERCOSUR, where
intra-zone exports plummeted by 41% as compared to
a decline of just 11% in exports to other countries.  As
a result, trade among the CACM countries continued
to account for an increasing share of the total, posting
a record figure of 35%, whereas in MERCOSUR this
indicator slumped to a low (12%) not seen since the
start of the 1990s.  The Andean Community’s intra-
zone trade expanded by 18%, but sales to other
countries were dragged down sharply by the slump in
oil prices.
Capital flows remain limited and unstable
Total capital inflows to Latin America and the Caribbean
in 2002 are estimated at around US$ 50 billion, which
is a far cry from the US$ 74 billion per year that the
region averaged in 1996-1998.  For 2002, autonomous
capital inflows are expected to amount to about US$ 38
billion, in addition to the US$ 11.5 billion in
compensatory financing that has already entered the
region.  The main component of private inflows will
continue to be FDI, as has been the case throughout the
last decade.  In contrast, net flows of debt and other
private capital will be negligible.
External finance has continued to be unstable and
volatile (see figure 6) as international investors become
increasingly risk-averse.  This is partly due to fallout
from the Argentine crisis, but it is also attributable to
political uncertainty in the region.  From mid-2002 on,
an additional factor has been the heightened volatility
of the world’s stock markets caused by the discovery
that large-scale frauds have been perpetrated in many
major United States firms.
Problems in obtaining external financing on the
market during the first semester are reflected in recent
trends in international reserves.  As of May, reserve assets
totalled some US$ 150 billion, one of the lowest levels
to be recorded since the Russian moratorium.  During
the early months of the year, significant reductions in
the reserves of Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Venezuela
were too large to be outweighed by the increases posted
in Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.
Following the external debt swap conducted by
Argentina in June 2001 and given the deep  discount at
which Argentine debt has been selling on the secondary
market since then, the restructuring plan offered in late
2001 proved to be unviable, and the Argentine
Government proceeded to suspend payments on its
public debt.  As of mid-2002, attempts to reinstate its
agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
have not borne fruit, although the Fund did agree to the
deferral of amortization and interest payments falling
due during the first semester.  Once Argentina succeeds
in putting its agreement with IMF back on track, it will
be able to obtain further disbursements, begin
negotiations on the restructuring of its external public
debt and embark upon the task of rebuilding its
economy’s monetary and financial foundations.
For the time being, however, the Argentine crisis
has had a contagion effect on the other economies in the
region (see the section on this topic below). In June,  a
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US$ 1.5 billion credit was approved to help Uruguay
recoup the international reserves it had to use during
the recent banking crisis.  In addition, volatility in
Brazil’s markets prompted it to make use of US$ 10
billion in IMF disbursements in order to build up its
international reserves.
The region’s FDI inflows are expected to shrink
significantly in 2002, falling to around US$ 40 billion.
This is far from the yearly average of nearly US$ 73
billion received in 1997-1999, a period when FDI
inflows were growing year by year.  Meanwhile, as in
2001, direct investment abroad will be virtually nil.
This marks a sharp contrast with the situation in 1997-
1999, when an average of US$ 7 billion was invested
abroad each year, almost all of it by residents of
Argentina, Brazil and Chile.  The slump in FDI in 2002
is partially accounted for by the sharp reduction in
purchases of existing assets. Some of the hardest-hit
countries are Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, which
posted record levels in 1999, 2000 and 2001,
respectively, thanks to large-scale corporate
acquisitions in those countries.
Placements on international bond markets in the first
semester amounted to just US$ 12 billion; this was only
half as much as in the first semester of 2001, and almost
all of the proceeds have been used to amortize matured
debt.  The bulk of these operations involved sovereign
bond issues placed by the region’s traditional lenders
(Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Uruguay and
Venezuela), but they were joined by the Governments
of Chile, El Salvador, Jamaica and Peru (the latter for
the first time since 1928).  PEMEX and PETROBRAS
were among the few corporations in the region to float
bond issues.
The terms and conditions for external finance had
shown an improvement in January-April 2002 over the
situation in late 2001 (with the exception of those
available to Uruguay), but they took a sharp turn for the
worse starting in May (see figure 7).  In the first four
months of the year, the cost of external financing
fluctuated around 12%, which was also the mean rate
applied to new issues by countries of the region.  In May
and June, however, conditions deteriorated, and by late
June the cost was approaching 14%, which was close to
the rate seen at the time of the Russian moratorium in
August 1998.  In this instance, the main factors
underlying the increase were the deep discounts applying
to Argentine and Brazilian paper on the secondary
market. If these two countries’ securities are not taken
into account, then the cost of external financing for 10
countries of the region amounted to an annual rate of
11% in June (between 7% and 8% for Chile, Costa Rica
and the Dominican Republic; between 9 and 10.5% for
Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Peru; and from 14% to
16% for Ecuador, Uruguay and Venezuela). The rise in
the cost of financing for the region was attributable to a
heightened perception of risk, as measured by the
variation in spreads, since the yield on United States
Treasury bonds held steady in the first semester at around
5% per annum.  The average spread for the region as of
late June was 900 basis points. Argentina, Brazil and
Uruguay witnessed the steepest increases, with their
spreads widening to almost twice as much as they had
been in late 2001 (see figure 8).































































LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: INTERNATIONAL BOND ISSUES
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the International Monetary Fund and Merrill Lynch.
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Figure 7
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: COST AND MATURITIES
OF INTERNATIONAL BOND ISSUES
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the International Monetary Fund, J.P. Morgan and Merrill Lynch.
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from J.P. Morgan.
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A shift in macroeconomic policy
Within this complex external context, the available
information for the early months of 2002 points towards
a change for the better in the contractionary monetary
and financial conditions observed in 2001.  This more
expansionary monetary policy stance has not yet,
however, sparked a recovery in domestic credit.
Meanwhile, a change in the more expansion-oriented
fiscal policy implemented in 2001 is expected. On more
than a few occasions, pressure generated by the external
environment and dwindling net financing have obliged
the authorities to take steps to scale back public
expenditure.
A more cautious fiscal policy
The dilemma facing fiscal authorities in choosing between
the objectives of maintaining the sustainability of public
finances by adopting a more austere policy stance and of
using fiscal instruments to soften the impact of recessionary
trends has become all the more difficult in 2002.  This has
been especially true from May onward because of the
uncertainty generated by the possibility of contagion from
the troubled situation in Argentina.  Following a moderate
expansion the year before, expenditure is expected to either
remain constant or increase only slightly in 2002.
In the first few months of the year, fiscal indicators
continued to worsen as revenues declined in most of the
countries.  Income was down very sharply in Argentina
and Venezuela and was somewhat lower in Barbados,
Jamaica, Mexico, Peru and Colombia.  In Brazil, Ecuador
and the Dominican Republic, fiscal revenues were
higher;  this resulted in a larger primary surplus in the
first of these countries, but spending increased even more
sharply in the other two.  Fiscal receipts in the Caribbean
countries were also hurt by the slump in tourist arrivals,
which have made no more than a partial recovery in the
wake of the events of 11 September 2001.
The management of monetary and exchange-rate
policies has also had an effect on public finances.  Lower
interest rates have reduced the cost of domestic
borrowing, but devaluations have complicated the
situation for national treasuries by increasing the relevant
countries’ external debt burdens.  In fact, in the case of
Brazil, the rate of devaluation actually increased, while
interest rate hikes and the indexation of government
paper drove up the cost of domestic borrowing.
As a result, the objectives of keeping the fiscal
deficit in check and controlling the size of the public
debt have prevailed over the pressing need to reactivate
the economies of the region.  One of the factors that has
exacerbated the situation in 2002 is the fact that the
economic authorities had already made use of fiscal
policy to smooth out the business cycle the year before,
and the degrees of freedom available to the countries’
governments are thus more limited than ever due to the
deterioration of the fiscal situation in 2001.  In fact, the
deficits of the countries’ non-financial public sectors
and central governments are, on average, in the range of
3%-4% of GDP (see figure 9).  Even in Chile, which is
in a sounder fiscal position that most of the countries in
the region, the discussion regarding the role that
macroeconomic policy should play in reactivating the
economy has, at least for the time being, led to the
advocacy of a cautious fiscal stance and a more active
role for monetary policy.
Another source of pressure will be the problem of
how to finance those fiscal deficits and refinance the
existing public debt, especially in countries where the
debt is equivalent to a high percentage of GDP.  Given
the conditions prevailing on international financial
markets, the funds to cover the countries’ fiscal deficits
are going to have to be obtained from domestic creditors
or multilateral agencies.  Consequently, many countries
in the region have announced policy changes or even
more specific measures aimed at maintaining fiscal
discipline.  Some of the measures that have been unveiled
so far are a reduction in capital expenditure equivalent
to one point of GDP in Colombia, widespread spending
cuts in a number of countries, tax hikes in Uruguay and
plans for further tax reforms in Colombia and Nicaragua.
The postponement or suspension of planned
privatizations in Ecuador, Paraguay and Peru has also
obliged the authorities in these countries to seek
alternative sources of fiscal revenue or, failing that, to
scale back expenditure.
Current conditions and outlook - Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean • 2001-2002 19
All of these measures will have a recessionary
impact on the countries’ already low levels of economic
activity.  In addition, political factors are also generating












LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: SAVINGS AND FISCAL BALANCE
OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS
(Percentages of GDP)
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
even more difficult in 2002, since presidential elections are
to be held this year in various countries (Bolivia, Brazil,
Colombia and Ecuador) and, in others, a heated debate has
arisen regarding the direction of economic policy.
Monetary variables reflect a more expansionary stance, but the supply and
demand for credit are unresponsive
The monetary authorities made a determined effort to
increase the monetary base and lower interest rates during
the first half of 2002 in an attempt to counteract the
contractionary influence of the external economic
environment.  In countries with more flexible exchange-
rate systems, these measures were also aimed at taking
advantage of the greater autonomy in the sphere of
monetary policy afforded by those regimes.  These efforts
succeeded in reversing the contractionary trend of
monetary and financial variables seen in 2001.  The
median value of the summary indicator used by ECLAC
to track these trends rose considerably, reflecting a more
expansionary monetary policy orientation (see figure 10).
In fact, the information available for most of the
countries as of May 2002 indicates that eight of them
increased their monetary bases by between 18% and 58% in
a 12-month period (Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Guatemala, Haiti, Jamaica, Mexico and Paraguay).  In
contrast, only four countries’ monetary bases showed negative
variations for the same 12-month period (–20% in Uruguay,
-17% in Venezuela, –1.7% in Chile and –0.1% in Ecuador).
Chile and Colombia posted very steep decreases in
their central bank intervention rates, which were near
or slightly lower than their rates of inflation at mid-year
(see figure 11).  In Brazil, on the other hand, the
overnight rate (the Selic rate) stayed at 18%, despite the
central bank’s repeated announcements regarding its
intention to lower it.  This level is similar to what it was
in mid-2001, which, given the country’s annual inflation
rate, is quite high.  In Mexico the downward trend in the
benchmark Cetes rate was reversed in May, and the Cetes
rose from around 5.3% to 7%.










LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: INDEX OF MONETARY CONDITIONS, 1999-2002 a
(Index 1995=100)
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from official sources and the International Monetary Fund.
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Figure 11
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: ANNUALIZED REAL INTEREST RATES a
(Percentages, semester averages)
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the International Monetary Fund.
a Short-term lending rates, deflated by the consumer price index
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The move towards a more expansionary monetary
policy has not had the hoped-for effect in most of the
countries because of slack demand for money and credit.
Credit growth rates lagged behind increases in the
monetary base in Colombia, Mexico, Costa Rica,
Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica and Peru.  This reflects
a conservative lending policy on the part of the banking
system and a cautious attitude on the part of investors,
both of which were in evidence the year before as well.
In 2002, these tendencies have been even stronger
in many of the Latin American countries’ financial
sectors.  Due to these economies’ degree of integration
in the international financial system and their great
vulnerability to external shocks, the main factors that
have aggravated the situation have to do with the
behaviour of the international financial market
(especially in the United States) and the depth of the
crisis in Argentina.  Smaller bank capital flows for many
countries and the losses sustained by Argentina have also
led to the adoption of a very conservative position by
foreign banks, many of which have begun to take local
contingent liabilities into consideration when calculating
their exposure.
Investor caution has also hurt financial flows to local
capital markets, which has in turn depressed local stock
indexes (see figure 12).  In fact, equity prices, as
measured by the International Finance Corporation
Global (IFCG) index, dropped by 7.2% in the first half
of 2002.  Some countries have witnessed even sharper
decreases (e.g., Brazil, Chile and Venezuela), and the
steep downward trend that began in the second quarter

































































Net inflows of autonomous capital (left-hand scale)
Indexes of stock-market prices in dollars (right-hand scale)
Figure 12
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: STOCK-MARKET PRICES
AND CAPITAL INFLOWS
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the International Monetary Fund and the International
Finance Corporation.
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Real exchange rates move in opposite directions
When two more countries (Argentina and Venezuela)
decided to float their currencies early in the year, dirty
floats (with the frequency of central bank intervention
varying from case to case) became the predominant
exchange-rate regime in Latin America and the
Caribbean, at least among the larger countries.  This has
given the region’s economies greater flexibility in
dealing with external shocks and in devising more active
monetary policy responses.
The scale of the devaluations of some of the larger
Southern Cone countries’ currencies against the dollar has
adversely affected their trading partners.  In what amounts
to a zero-sum game for the region’s countries as a group,
these devaluations have enabled some economies to
improve their competitive positions, but at the cost of a
reduction in the competitiveness of their neighbours’ real
effective exchange rates (see box 1).  The outcome has
been a very slight depreciation in real effective exchange
rates and, in contrast, a very steep depreciation in real
bilateral exchange rates against the dollar (see figure 13).
The latter has eroded the capital base of private and public
agents holding dollar-denominated debt.
Bilateral rate Brazil-






















REAL BILATERAL EXCHANGE RATES
Brazil-Argentina and Colombia-Venezuela (Base year 1995=100)
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from official sources and from the International Monetary Fund.
In Mexico, on the other hand, the strength of the
peso –which has been fortified by the abundant capital
inflows received by the country in recent years– drove
down the real exchange rate to very low levels.  The
peso did begin to reduce this exchange-rate lag towards
the end of the first semester of 2002, however.
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Box 1
A WIDENING GAP BETWEEN EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES
AND BILATERAL EXCHANGE RATES AGAINST THE DOLLAR
In 2001-2002, a number of countries
in the region witnessed an atypical
widening of the differential between
the real effective exchange rate and
their real bilateral exchange rate
against the United States dollar.  This
was particularly true of the
MERCOSUR countries and their
associates (Chile and Bolivia).  As is
shown in figure 14, bilateral
exchange rates depreciated quite
sharply against the United States
dollar, but this was not reflected in
those same countries’ effective
exchange rates, which appreciated or
changed very little.  This
phenomenon serves to illustrate the
undesirable effects that devaluations
or depreciation have had on trading
partners within the region.
Although a real devaluation
does increase the external
competitiveness of tradeable goods
and services produced by the
devaluing country, when intraregional
trading activity is quite active –as it
typically is in the case of trade in
manufactures among all the members
of the various subregional integration
schemes in Latin America– then a
devaluation will reduce the
competitiveness of trading partners in
the region.  Moreover, if the variations
are sizeable, then the resulting gains
are usually short lived.  Since the
affected trading partners can also
devalue their currencies, the end
result may be that the export capacity
for manufactured products of all the
countries in the region may be
damaged, inasmuch as –unlike
commodity exports– these exports
can not readily be diverted to other
markets.  Since the presence of small
and medium-sized enterprises in
international trade flows is generally
significant only in terms of sales to
neighbouring countries, these firms
are the most vulnerable to sudden
changes in exchange rates within any
given subregion.
This situation illustrates just how
complicated it is to manage national
macroeconomic policies within a
context of increasing globalization and
regional integration.  Another example
is provided by the events that took
place in Europe in the 1970s, when the
destabilizing effects of a series of
competitive devaluations drew attention
to the need to coordinate foreign-
exchange policies and ultimately led to
the formation of a monetary union.  For
today’s emerging economies, these
trade-transmitted direct costs are
augmented by the effects of financial
contagion.  Thus, as a group, the
countries of the region would be better
off if they succeeded in coordinating
their macroeconomic policies (and
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LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: REAL EFFECTIVE AND BILATERAL EXCHANGE RATES
(Variation between fourth quarter of 2000 and second quarter of 2002) a
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
 a  An increase denotes a real devaluation.
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The reform process continues to lose momentum
The economic slowdown has taken its toll on reform
programmes in the region, which have also been affected
by the run-up to elections in several countries and
political troubles in others.
Privatizations have taken the brunt of the
downswing’s impact. In Ecuador, Paraguay and Peru,
scheduled projects have been suspended altogether,
while in other countries auctions have aroused less and
less interest among investors. As part of the effort to
modernize the State apparatus, bills designed to
strengthen the tax base have been introduced in
Colombia, Guyana, Mexico and Nicaragua, and the
Government of Ecuador has passed a law establishing a
petroleum stabilization fund. The efforts of the
Governments of Antigua and Barbuda, Grenada and
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines were rewarded in
March 2002, when these countries were removed from
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development’s list of uncooperative tax havens.
The institutional development of regional
integration processes has been patchy in 2002. The
greatest difficulties have arisen in MERCOSUR, whose
members are all experiencing economic problems. It is
noteworthy, however, that in view of the limited scope
of national responses to regional and international
disturbances, a number of subregional groupings have
taken steps to increase the coordination of their
macroeconomic policies (e.g., the Andean Community)
or have carried forward plans for monetary union (e.g.,
CARICOM) (see box 2). In June 2002, Chile completed
its negotiations with the European Union and signed a
political and economic association agreement under
which 85% of Chilean exports to the European Union
will enjoy tariff-free treatment.
Box 2
REGIONAL INTEGRATION PROCESSES IN THE FIRST SEMESTER OF 2002
MERCOSUR has undertaken a
number of joint initiatives in order to
tackle the problems facing some of its
members. At the group’s latest
biannual summit meeting, held in
Buenos Aires on 7 July 2002,
discussions revolved around the
crisis in the host country, and
Argentina and Brazil signed a letter of
intent to conclude an agreement on
the automotive industry.
In 2002 the Andean
Community established a basic set
of regulations and standards for its
common external tariff. The members
have already submitted proposed
lists of goods to be included under
each of the agreed tariff levels, and
those lists are now under review. The
Advisory Council of Ministers of
Economic Affairs has continued to
make headway in the sphere of
macroeconomic coordination and has
adopted new convergence criteria
regarding fiscal matters and public
debt.
In March the countries of the
Central American Common Market
(CACM) signed a plan of action for
economic integration and an
agreement on investment and trade in
services. The aim of the agreement is
to establish a legal framework with
clear, transparent and mutually
beneficial rules on the promotion and
protection of investments and trade in
services in order to facilitate the
participation of different economic
agents.
The most significant advances
made by the Caribbean Community
(CARICOM) were reflected in
additional protocols to the Revised
Treaty of Chaguaramas which
provide for the free movement of
people, capital and services and
which safeguard the right of
establishment. A deadline of July
2002 was set for the entry into force
of the provision on the free
movement of persons. At the twenty-
third Meeting of the Conference of
Heads of Government, which took
place in Georgetown, Guyana in
July 2002, the countries examined
the status of the integration process
and reaffirmed their commitment to
make joint preparations for future
negotiations in connection with the
Free Trade Area of the Americas,
the World Trade Organization and
the European Union.
In early July 2002 Mexico took
a step towards developing closer
relations with the MERCOSUR
countries by signing a trade
agreement with Brazil in which the
two countries agree to lower
agricultural and industrial tariffs on
some 800 products. Within the
framework of the North American
Free Trade Agreement, in January
2002 it also began to reduce tariffs
on some US$ 5 billion worth of
products, including footwear and
motor vehicles.
Current conditions and outlook - Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean • 2001-2002 25
The anticipated upturn in growth is delayed
The economic growth outlook in Latin America and
the Caribbean for 2002 is not promising. After
expanding by a mere 0.3% in 2001, regional GDP is
expected to contract by 0.8%, while per capita GDP
will slip by 2.4%. The recession that began in the third
quarter of 2001 was deepened by a decrease of over
3% in output in the first quarter of 2002 (see figure
15), and six of the region’s countries –Argentina,
Brazil, Haiti, Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela– posted
negative growth rates for that period. The situation
brightened somewhat in the following months,
however, and it is expected that the economy will see a
more solid improvement in the second semester.  Even
if an upswing does occur, however, it will not be strong
enough to make up for the ground lost during the first
half of the year.
-13,5

























LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT





26 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
The weakness of economic growth in 2002 is largely
attributable to the collapse of production activity in
Argentina and its implications for the region. The other
countries will grow by around 1%, which is lower than
the estimated world average for 2002 of just under 2%,
and well below the 3.2% forecast for developing
economies. What is more, the great majority of the
countries will turn in a worse performance than in 2001,
with Belize, Costa Rica and Peru being the main
exceptions to this rule.
This means that in 2002 the region will have lost a
full half-decade of growth. In that time per capita GDP
will have fallen to a point nearly 2% below its 1997
level.  All of this is compounded by extreme volatility.
The region has not experienced such an adverse situation
since the debt crisis during the first half of the 1980s,
when output grew by less than 3% in five years and per
capita GDP contracted by more than 7%, also under
highly volatile conditions.
The Latin American countries fall into two groups
in terms of their growth prospects for 2002. In the first
group, composed of Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay and
Venezuela, output is expected to decline.   In Argentina,
the recession that has gripped the country since 1999
has taken a turn for the worse, and the level of activity is
forecast to fall by about 13.5% in 2002. The sharpest
contraction occurred in the second semester of 2001 and
the first quarter of 2002, however, when GDP shrank by
16.3% with respect to the same period of the preceding
year. Since then, there have been signs that the sharp
downward trend in production activity is beginning to
ease. The Paraguayan economy will witness a severe
slowdown in GDP growth, which is expected to slide
from its 2001 mark of 2.7% to -1% in 2002, chiefly
because of the Argentine crisis. Uruguay is in a similar
position, as the decline in activity has intensified in 2002
(see the section on the transmission of the Argentine
crisis to neighboring countries). Venezuela is also
expected to post a negative growth rate (-3.5%) amid
political problems compounded by the impact of
adjustment measures adopted to deal with the
macroeconomic disequilibria that had built up in
previous years. In the first quarter, economic activity
slid by 4.2%, with activity down by 7.6% in the
petroleum industry and by 2.6% in the non-petroleum
sector.
The Latin American countries in the second group
are expected to turn in moderate growth rates of between
0% and 3% of GDP. Brazil’s GDP decreased by just
under 1% in the first quarter, and any prospect of an
upturn in the second semester will be limited by strong
pressures from financial markets. In Chile, growth
projections point to a 2.5% rate owing to slack domestic
demand and a downturn in investments that have been
exacerbated by the adverse international and regional
environments. Mexico’s output shrank by 2% in the first
quarter, thus completing nine consecutive months of
declining production activity. This performance is
attributable to sagging domestic demand. The second
quarter of 2002 brought some signs of an upturn; whether
or not this trend holds up will depend on the duration
and magnitude of the recovery of the United States
economy.
Peru is expected to perform well in 2002, with a
growth rate of 3%, thanks to an upsurge in primary
activities and construction together with an increase in
the volume of exports. Economic activity in Colombia
has continued to be constrained by sluggish domestic
demand and slackening industrial activity in the first
quarter of 2002, all of which has been exacerbated by a
loss of momentum in export activity. On the basis of the
first-quarter results, when GDP grew by a scant 0.5%,
analysts agree that the economy will perform poorly for
the year overall, with a growth rate of around 1%. In
Ecuador, economic activity has been trending sharply
downward, and the high growth rate of 5.6% posted in
2001 will drop to around 2.5% in 2002. The boost
provided by investment in a new oil pipeline will mainly
benefit the construction industry. The Bolivian economy
appears to be headed for a growth rate of around 1.5%,
which would fall within the lower range of official
estimates.
One of the traits shared by the Central American
countries is the continuation of a relatively slow-growth
scenario. In the first quarter of 2002, economic
expansion was moderate in Costa Rica and Panama, and
the outlook for the year as a whole is muted. In
Guatemala, an upturn that began in June 2001 carried
over into early 2002; in February, the gain was fairly
limited, however, with a year-on-year rate of 0.3%. This
lacklustre performance reflects a downturn in exports
together with sluggish private investment, with the latter
being a reflection of a controversy between the
government and the private sector that remains
unresolved. In El Salvador, an upsurge in construction
–boosted by increased government spending and
reconstruction projects– could spur activity in the wider
economy, reactivate employment and rekindle the
maquila sector by attracting new investments to it.
The situation in the Caribbean countries is very
mixed. In the Dominican Republic, the economic policy
adopted in 2001 continued to fuel domestic demand in
the early months of 2002. The economy grew by a robust
4.3% in the first quarter, though this was far short of the
high growth rates (7.2%) recorded in the second half of
the 1990s. Sustained flows of FDI and of remittances
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from Dominican nationals living abroad shored up
growth. External demand remained lethargic, however,
and this was reflected in a downturn in exports from
both the export processing zones and domestic sources,
as well as in a decline in tourism revenues. Cuba’s growth
rate is expected to stall, while in Haiti, where the situation
continues to give cause for concern due to adverse
domestic conditions, a contraction in GDP is projected.
The CARICOM economies will see GDP grow by
a projected 1% in 2002.  This net result will be a
reflection of a decline in output in Barbados, Dominica
and Saint Kitts and Nevis, together with positive growth
rates in the other economies. Jamaica’s growth rate is
expected to be around 2.5%, while the economy of
Trinidad and Tobago is likely to post a 3% growth rate.
The countries whose economies depend on tourism were
hit hard by the drop-off in this activity that came in the
wake of the 11 September attacks in the United States.
This phenomenon carried over into the first semester of
2002, and any improvement in the following months will
largely depend on the performance of the United States
economy. The external environment exerted a negative
influence on both output and exports of such agricultural
products as sugar and bananas.
Investment and saving take a turn for the worse
Investment and saving have failed to show any sign of
improving upon the mediocre figures posted in 2001.
National saving will remain low, in keeping with the trend
of recent years, while external saving is expected to drop
to just over 2% of GDP.  Given the existence of idle
production capacity and the absence of any clear signs of
an upturn, regional investment is likely to remain slack.
Most of the countries for which data are available
recorded hefty decreases in investment in the early
months of 2002 (-4.4%). In fact, seven of the nine
reporting countries posted sharp downswings: Argentina
(-46.1%), Brazil (-8.4%), Chile (-2%), Colombia (-6%),
Mexico (-1%), Peru (-3.5%) and Uruguay (-34%). This
group includes the region’s three largest domestic
markets, which indicates that the generalized downturn
in the external environment has engulfed the whole of
the region’s internal economy.
In Argentina, investment has fallen to nearly half
its former level due to outflows of private capital and
the continued erosion of international reserves. In
Bolivia, private investment –the main factor underlying
the slackening of domestic demand– has failed to recover
despite the downward trend in interest rates seen
throughout the preceding year and abundant liquidity.
Domestic investment in Brazil has faltered in an
atmosphere marked by uncertainty and high interest
rates. After a small upswing in January, investment in
Mexico receded again in February and March. In Peru,
domestic demand remains weak, especially in the case
of investment, which in the first quarter exhibited a year-
on-year decrease in both the public and private sectors.
Uruguay has seen investment figures fall sharply.
Costa Rica and Ecuador are the only countries to
have seen a significant increase in investment in the first
half of 2002. In Costa Rica, investment will probably
weaken as the year goes on and will be concentrated in
high-technology and energy projects. Public investment
will remain low after dropping sharply in 2001. In
Ecuador, the upturn in investment has carried over into
2002 thanks to the construction of a new pipeline for
heavy crude oil and to exploratory and drilling activities,
especially in the petroleum sector.
The labour situation continues to deteriorate
With economic activity weak, labour demand remained
sluggish in the first semester of 2002, and in most of the
countries for which data are available –Argentina, Brazil,
Ecuador, Mexico and Uruguay– the rate of employment
was lower than it had been a year earlier (see figure 16).
The rate remained stable in Chile and Peru, and
Colombia and Venezuela posted increases. The regional
employment rate (the weighted average for these nine
countries) therefore declined once again (from 53.2%
to 52.6%).
28 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
Private formal-sector employment fell back sharply
in Argentina, dropping by around 5% between January
and May of 2002, and by around 10% with respect to
the same period of 2001, with data from Greater Buenos
Aires showing heavy job losses in construction and
commerce. In Mexico, formal employment fell by 2.5%
in the period January-April 2002 with respect to the
same four months of 2001. The number of formal-
sector wage earners is bouncing back, however, as the
April figure was 1.5% higher than in January. The
downward trend in maquila employment levelled off
at the beginning of 2002, but losses remained very
heavy by comparison with the year before, since the
rate was down by 17.5% in the first quarter of this year
as compared to the same period of 2001. The outlook
is brighter in Brazil, where formal employment in the
first five months of the year was 2.3% higher than in
the same period a year earlier, and in Chile, where the
number of workers in the formal sector rose by 2.5%
between March 2001 and March 2002.
After an abrupt drop in the labour force participation
rate in 2001, in line with the general economic situation,
the two variables continued to move in tandem in seven
of the nine countries for which information is available.
In Peru, for example, output and labour force
participation increased, while both variables trended
downward in Argentina and Uruguay. Exceptions were
Venezuela, where the rate of participation increased
despite a downturn in output, and Ecuador, where the
employed labour force shrank even through economic
growth was relatively strong.
At the regional level, the mixed performance of the
various countries combined to hold the labour force
participation rate relatively steady and this, together with
the marked downtrend in employment, pushed the rate
of unemployment up sharply (from 8.5% in the first
semester of 2001 to 9.4% a year later). A rate of 9.3% is
expected for the year 2002 overall.  If this projection is
borne out, this alarmingly high annual rate will set a
new record for the region (see figure 17).
Wages were affected by the depressed level of
economic activity in several countries in the early months
of 2002. In Brazil, the year-on-year decrease in real wages
for the period from January to April amounted to 6%,
although this decline is now easing off. In Mexico, the
strong upward trend in real wages that took shape in 2001
as inflation subsided has come to an end. Although wages
in the first quarter of 2002 were up by 3.4% on the rate
recorded for the same period of 2001, the data for early
2002 already show a decrease with respect to the second
semester of 2001. In Argentina and Uruguay, rising
inflation has cut into real wages, which declined by
between 3% and 4% in the early months of the year. The
downtrend in real wages grew steeper thereafter, especially
in Argentina.  In contrast, reductions in what were already
low inflation rates helped to drive up real wages by 2.5%
in Chile and by 3.3% in Colombia in the period January-
April 2002 as compared to the same period of 2001.
Figure 16
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: EMPLOYMENT
(Employed persons as a percentage of the working-age population, first semester of each year)
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
a Preliminary figures.
b Weighted average.
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Inflation remains low in most of the countries of the region













LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: URBAN UNEMPLOYMENT
(Percentage of the economically active population, first semester of each year)








In the first half of 2002, at an annualized rate of just
over 8%, the rate of inflation for the region as a whole
was up by two percentage points over its 2001 level.
Wholesale prices increased more sharply, with the 12-
month rate rising to 14.4%, which was nine points higher
than the year before. The higher regional rate masks large
differences, however, as it is attributable almost entirely
to the steep hike in Argentina, where inflation soared by
30% in the first semester owing to the steep devaluation
that followed the demise of the convertibility regime
early in the year. Inflation was also up in Uruguay and
Venezuela, with increases of between five and seven
percentage points on the figures posted in 2001.  In these
cases, too, substantial devaluations were to blame for
the rise. The other countries continued to register the
moderate rates of inflation observed in past years (see
figure 18).
Apart from these inflationary surges in particular
countries, the regional inflation picture was therefore
quite favourable, as shown by the fact that only three
economies posted double-digit rates. This was
attributable to virtually the same factors as in 2001. These
primarily structural factors, such as economic
liberalization and the sound management of monetary
policy, continued to contribute to regional inflation’s
convergence towards the rates seen in developed
countries. Other aspects of current economic conditions
also played a role, however, particularly the recession
now troubling the Latin American and Caribbean
economies. The stability of the exchange rate in a number
of countries has also helped to keep inflation low. In
countries that have witnessed larger devaluations,
inflation is higher, but still well below the rise in the
exchange rate.
The outlook in terms of inflation in the second
semester of 2002 is uncertain in several countries
–including Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and
Venezuela– given their rising exchange rates and the
upswing in wholesale prices. Nevertheless, in the first
semester of 2002, as in 2001, the impact of
devaluations was mitigated by the severe recession
that has engulfed the region. In a number of countries,
including Argentina, most of this impact was absorbed
in the first semester, and the direct inflationary
pressures generated by devaluations began to ease
midway through the year.
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In the other countries, the prospects for the second
part of the year are bright. The country in the best
position is Ecuador, which has recorded another
substantial decrease in inflation thanks to the
dollarization of its economy, although it will be hard-
pushed to achieve a single-digit figure. Producer prices
display a smaller increase than consumer prices,
making it likely that Ecuador’s inflation will soon be
nearly on a par with the regional average. The fact
remains, however, that the competitiveness of its
economy has been eroded by the steep hikes in
domestic prices seen in 1999 and early 2000. Costa
Rica has also turned in a good performance, as inflation
is down to less than 8% after several years of double-
digit rates, and this may be taken as a signal that its
stabilization process may be well on its way towards
consolidation. Inflation is also considerably lower in
Colombia and Nicaragua. Colombia has managed to
consolidate the ongoing stabilization process it began
several years ago, this time thanks to a lower rate of
devaluation. Barbados and Panama have continued to
post their traditionally low rates of inflation. The fact
that Bolivia, Chile, the Dominican Republic, El
Salvador, Guatemala and Peru have again recorded very
low rates clearly signals the consolidation of these
countries’ stabilization processes. The same can be said
















































LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: CONSUMER PRICES
(Twelve-month variation)
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
a Projections.
a
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REGIONAL REPERCUSSIONS OF THE ARGENTINE CRISIS
The severe crisis in the Argentine economy has not only
affected all domestic economic activity in that country
but has also shaken neighbouring economies.
Argentina’s imports from its neighbours are expected to
tumble from US$ 6.5 billion in 2001 to slightly more
than US$ 2.2 billion in 2002.  The reduction is likely to
be somewhat steeper for Paraguay and Uruguay.2
The magnitude of the crisis is a cause of serious
concern in Latin America and the Caribbean.  In addition
to its direct effects on the region’s economies, it is also
exacerbating the difficulties that the countries were
already facing as a result of their own domestic problems
and the series of shocks they have sustained in recent
years.  The greatest danger of all, however, is that these
disturbances could be transmitted to other economies.
Contagion of this sort could trigger a systemic crisis in
the region and perhaps even in other emerging
economies.  This threat is particularly serious because
of the current fragility of the world’s financial system.
The problems that have beset the Brazilian economy
(including, in particular, the marked volatility of its
foreign-exchange market) since May 2002 have
provided further grounds for these concerns. Brazil
served as an anchor for the region in 2001 and following
the breakdown of Argentina’s convertibility scheme, but
its performance of that role now appears to be faltering.
It should be noted, however, that the principal indicator
of perceived risk in emerging markets (the JP Morgan
Emerging Market Bond Index, or EMBI), which had
reached its lowest point since the August 1998 Russian
crisis at the end of the first quarter of 2002, is now
beginning to rebound.
The Argentine crisis’ regional repercussions have
taken various forms.  Firstly, it has had a strong impact
on trade in both goods and services with Argentina, and
this in turn has driven down the level of economic activity
and employment.  Secondly, its effects on the financial
market have had an adverse influence on the flow of
external resources to the region, the countries’ banking
systems and the profits of foreign firms that have invested
in Argentina and in the rest of the region, thus unsettling
stock markets outside the region as well.  In addition,
the crisis has heightened the volatility of foreign-
exchange markets and has influenced economic policy,
as some governments have been obliged to take action
to address its implications for their countries.  Uruguay,
in particular, has had to adopt drastic adjustment
measures in order to counteract its impacts; these steps
have included a steeper rate of devaluation and the
introduction of fiscal provisions designed to shrink the
public deficit.
Events in Argentina and the other MERCOSUR
countries have rekindled the debate as to what types of
exchange-rate regimes are most suitable for emerging
economies.  They have also, in particular, laid bare the
practical limitations of the two “corner solutions” of
dollarization or a pure float in a context of
macroeconomic and institutional fragility combined with
commercial and financial interdependence.  The need
to align and coordinate macroeconomic policies within
the region has also become evident.
(a) The impact on trade
The striking drop in Argentina’s imports, which are
estimated to have plunged by approximately two-thirds
their former level during the first four months of 2002,
has left them at around the same levels as in the 1970s.
The sharp devaluation of the currency and the weakness
of domestic demand have both been important factors
in this regard and have been reflected in a steep decrease
in shipments to Argentina from its MERCOSUR partners
and Chile.  In some of these countries, exports to
Argentina represent an appreciable percentage of their
total foreign sales.  Thus, the already very tense situation
in MERCOSUR caused by the January 1999 devaluation
of Brazil’s currency has been aggravated by the sharp
depreciation of the Argentine peso. The economies of
the region have also had to deal with a considerable
decline in services trade, much of which is attributable
to the abrupt decrease in the number of Argentine
tourists.
Uruguay has unquestionably been hit the hardest
by the Argentine crisis and its impact in compounding
the negative fallout from Brazil’s 1999 devaluation.
Trade flows with Argentina have been cut back
considerably in 2002, with Uruguay’s merchandise
2 For further information on the situation in Argentina, see the section on that country in the second part of the ECLAC Economic Survey
of Latin America and the Caribbean, 2001-2002 (LC/G.2179-P), Santiago, Chile, 2002.
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exports to that market in the first four months of the
year plunging to a level 70% below the figure posted
for the same period the year before.  The situation is
even more serious than it might first appear, given the
fact that exports had already fallen sharply in 2001.  In
addition, Argentine importers have had great difficulty
in paying for the products that Uruguay has exported to
them, due to the blockage of their funds and their loss
of access to credit of any sort whatsoever.  Meanwhile,
tourism from Argentina to Uruguay has slumped to
almost half its former level.  The direct impact of the
Argentine crisis is calculated at somewhat more than
two percentage points of GDP, with a decrease in exports
amounting to nearly US$ 500 million.
Brazil has also been hurt by the Argentine crisis,
even though its economy is three times as large as its
neighbour’s and its markets are considerably more
diversified.  The steep slide in Brazil’s exports to
Argentina has caused its total merchandise exports to
shrink by almost 6% (in 2001 Argentina bought 8.6%
of Brazil’s exports, and the figure rises to nearly 25% in
the case of exports of manufactured goods).  This has
led to a substantial downturn in sales, especially of motor
vehicles and parts, iron and steel products,
petrochemicals and electronics, many of which are
difficult to divert to other markets in the short run.
Brazilian exporters, like their Uruguayan counterparts,
also have had difficulty in obtaining payment for what
they do manage to sell.  In fact, as of early 2002, payment
was outstanding on US$ 1.4 billion in exports.  Tourism
has also been stifled, especially in the southern part of
the country, which had been a popular destination for
Argentine visitors in recent years.
Paraguay, too, has been shaken by the turmoil in
Argentina, which has magnified the country’s pre-
existing domestic problems.  The suspension of the sale
of the telecommunications firm Compañía Paraguaya
de Comunicaciones has generated a great deal of
uncertainty, since that operation would have brought in
around US$ 200 million in one-off foreign-exchange
revenues.  Paraguayan exports to Argentina sank by
almost two thirds in early 2002 owing to the devaluation
of the peso, thereby paring down Paraguay’s total
merchandise sales by nearly 12% from the preceding
year’s level.
The Argentine crisis also had an impact on the real
sector of the Chilean economy.  Bilateral merchandise
trade, tourism and the profits of Chilean firms with
branches in Argentina are the areas in which its effects
have been the most conspicuous.  Although exports to
Argentina represented just 3.2% of Chile’s total exports
in 2001, the impact of the downswing seen in the first
quarter of 2002 was quite appreciable (–61.5%).  Three
fourths of the decrease corresponded to industrial
products.  The impact on industrial value added is
estimated at a reduction equivalent to fourth tenths of a
point of its growth rate; in terms of GDP, the direct
impact is calculated at one tenth of a point and the
indirect effect of purchases of intermediate goods from
the rest of the economy is estimated at another three
tenths. Tourism in Chile was down sharply in early 2002,
and the contraction in tourism revenues is calculated at
US$ 50 million (equivalent to a decrease of one-tenth
point of GDP growth, which could rise to two tenths
when indirect effects are taken into account).
Despite its magnitude, the devaluation’s effect in
boosting the price competitiveness of Argentine goods
has not yet served as a stimulus.  On the contrary, in the
period January-April, total Argentine exports declined
by 5% and those destined for neighbouring countries
(MERCOSUR and Chile) were off by 17%.  The
financial crisis has seriously disturbed trade flows, and
the lack of credit, the need to pay cash for raw materials
and the higher cost of inputs have, at least for now, offset
the effects of the devaluation.
 Remittances from emigrants working in Argentina
have also been hurt by the sheer drop in wages and the
sharp devaluation of the currency.  The countries that
have been the most seriously affected by these trends
have been Bolivia and Paraguay, where current transfers
represent around 5% and 2% of GDP, respectively, and
a considerable portion of those sums (as much as one
half in Paraguay’s case) comes from Argentina.  This
situation has a much more severe impact on low-income
sectors of the population in these countries.
(b) The financial impact
The Argentine crisis has affected the financial
market in many different ways. It is difficult to identify
individual effects and still more difficult to measure the
incidence of each, however, as the scenario is clouded
by the systemic volatility that has been an endemic
feature of emerging markets since the Asian crisis.
Firstly, the crisis in Argentina has affected capital
flows to Latin America from international financial
markets. This was beginning to occur even before the
collapse of the convertibility regime due to mounting
expectations of a default on debt servicing and to greater
risk aversion in general, as reflected by trends in
sovereign bond spreads. Bond issues on international
markets have borne the brunt of this contraction in capital
flows. At the same time, FDI, which had been flooding
into the region in recent years, declined significantly
in 2002.
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The shrinkage of external capital flows raised the cost
of borrowing for Brazil and Uruguay, though not for Chile.
Brazil’s country risk rating rose by over 100 basis points
in the second semester of 2001.  This was probably due,
in large part, to growing fears of a default by Argentina.
Towards the end of the year, however, the risk rating began
to drop back again.  It then continued to decrease even
when Argentina abandoned the convertibility scheme and
announced that it was suspending payment on its public
debt, which shows that the impact of the situation had
already been absorbed. Brazil’s country-risk rating began
to climb again in May 2002, but little of this can be
attributed to contagion from Argentina, as it was mainly
the result of domestic problems stemming from political
uncertainty in the run-up to the October elections and
higher risk aversion.
Uruguay’s difficulties in reducing its fiscal deficit
in the midst of a contraction in international credit
undermined its sovereign debt rating, and it eventually
lost its investment grade status. This made it more
difficult to refinance its external debt and led lenders to
raise their interest rates. Late in April, contagion from
the profound crisis in Argentina combined with the
withdrawal of the country’s investment-grade status to
undercut the value of official debt instruments on the
secondary market. This pushed up Uruguay’s country
risk rating to around 800 basis points, which was more
than three times higher than in late 2001. The situation
worsened further when the government abandoned its
system of exchange-rate bands and allowed the currency
to float, and the country risk rating therefore continues
to climb.
Chile’s country risk rating has remained very low,
but flows have decreased nonetheless. Up to October
2001, this trend was reflected in a devaluation of the
currency on foreign-exchange markets. At that point,
short-term movements began to become partially
delinked from the disturbances in Argentina, and the
currency’s value began to rise again. In June 2002,
however, the worsening financial situation in Brazil
generated further currency instability in Chile, and the
exchange rate for the peso began to shadow the value of
the Brazilian real.
The loss of momentum in FDI flows to the region
in 2000 interrupted the steady upward trend that had
begun in 1993. This was largely due to the completion
of the countries’ privatization of their saleable assets,
although the effects of the Argentine crisis were also
beginning to be felt to some extent. In 2002 the situation
has continued to deteriorate as foreign firms operating
in Argentina struggle to shake off the effects of the sharp
devaluation of the currency and to deal with the problems
caused by the readjustment of prices and public utility
rates and by restrictions on the exportation of petroleum.
This has discouraged investment not only in Argentina
but also in other countries of the region. While foreign
investment has plunged in Argentina in 2002, in Brazil
an existing downward trend has sharpened and Chile has
recorded a downturn. The cooling of investor interest
stems both from fears that other countries of the region
will be pulled into a downward spiral by contagion from
Argentina and from the asset losses sustained by
international and regional investors in the Argentine
market.
A second area in which the impact of the Argentine
crisis has been felt is in the solvency of the financial
market. The exposure of banks in Argentina has had a
considerable impact, but this has not greatly affected
financial institutions in the rest of the region, except
through specific channels in Paraguay and Uruguay.
Large foreign banks operating in Argentina –with parent
companies in North America, Spain and other European
countries– have been badly hit by the crisis. Some of
the Brazilian banks with branches in Argentina have also
been affected, but the volume of their operations is small
in relation to their assets, so they have been able to absorb
the losses without too much difficulty.
By contrast, three Uruguayan banks that were
heavily exposed in Argentina are now experiencing
serious problems. Its inability to access its deposits in
Argentina led to the temporary closure of one Uruguayan
bank, most of whose clients were Argentine, when the
parent bank cut off its flow of funds. As a result, in early
2002 most of the foreign-currency deposits that had been
made in 2001 were withdrawn; consequently, the
country’s international reserves declined substantially.
In Paraguay, the authorities had to intervene in one of
the country’s major banks to deal with problems
generated by its losses in Argentina and the loss of
confidence on the part of savers, who shifted their funds
into dollar deposits.
The deterioration of the financial system has also
been exacerbated by the fact that, contrary to the
expectations of savers, foreign-owned banks in Argentina
have not always been willing to bring in resources in
order to pay out deposits. In fact, several institutions
have openly expressed doubts about remaining in the
market, and two banks –one Canadian and one French
institution– have withdrawn altogether, thereby adding
to the atmosphere of uncertainty. In addition, the
restrictions placed on the withdrawal of deposits in
Argentina have generated serious disturbances in some
neighbouring countries due to fears that they may resort
to similar measures.
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In some cases, investors’ misgivings have to do with
the sustainability of the countries’ macroeconomic
policies, since domestic economic growth remains
sluggish and it is becoming increasingly difficult for
them to finance their fiscal and current account deficits
or to refinance existing debts.
Lastly, the effects of the losses sustained by
transnational corporations operating in Argentina in
terms of those corporations’ capital assets could have
repercussions for FDI throughout the region. The impact
on the capital base of European firms that are heavily
involved in Argentina has been very severe, especially
in the case of utilities, the oil industry, manufacturing
and the financial sector. The sharp downswing in the
Madrid stock exchange is partly attributable to the capital
losses registered by firms belonging to the large Spanish
conglomerates that have invested in Argentina, and this
may well represent one of the most extensive forms of
contagion. In other European countries, large
transnational groups –especially in telecommunications,
financial services and the automotive industry– have had
to set aside massive reserves to cover the losses of their
Argentine subsidiaries. In the region, apart from the
repercussions in the banking sector that have already
been discussed, the greatest impact has been seen in
Chile, whose firms’ investments in Argentina amount to
some US$ 3.2 billion. These investments have been
seriously undermined, with their equity values dropping
by 12% in the weeks following the devaluation.
Corporate profits plunged from US$ 208 million in 2000
to US$ 114 million in 2001, and returns are expected to
fall to zero for 2002. As a result, national income is
calculated to have fallen by 0.15% in 2001, and in 2002
a similar decrease is projected. Brazil has fairly large
investments in Argentina, but the impact on its domestic
economy has been relatively slight.
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Table A - 1
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 a
Annual growth rates
Economic activity and prices
Gross domestic product 3.3 5.2 1.1 3.7 5.2 2.3 0.5 3.9 0.4
Per capita gross domestic product 1.6 3.4 -0.5 2.1 3.5 0.7 -1.1 2.3 -1.1
Consumer prices b 872.4 328.7 26.0 18.6 10.7 10.0 9.7 9.0 6.1
Percentages
Urban open unemployment 6.6 6.6 7.5 8.0 7.6 8.1 8.9 8.4 8.4
Fiscal balance / GDP c -1.7 -2.0 -1.7 -1.6 -1.3 -2.2 -3.0 -2.8 -3.3
Total disbursed external debt / GDP c 37.5 35.0 36.4 34.8 33.1 37.0 43.0 37.6 39.0
External debt / exports of goods
and services 263.5 245.3 226.1 211.8 198.5 223.6 218.3 177.7 178.0
Billions of dollars
External sector
Exports of goods and services 194 223 266 295 328 327 342 407 392
Imports of goods and services 215 251 278 305 361 381 364 420 412
Trade balance (goods and services) -21 -27 -12 -10 -33 -54 -22 -13 -20
Balance on current account -45 -52 -37 -38 -65 -88 -55 -46 -51
Balance on capital and financial
account d 70 42 29 68 85 69 49 61 33
Overall balance 17 -15 -20 30 20 -18 -6 15 -18
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
a Preliminary estimates. b December-to-December variation. c Estimates based on figures expressed in dollars at current prices. d Includes
errors and omissions.
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Table A - 2
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
(Annual growth rates)
1992-
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001a
2001
Latin America and
the Caribbean b 2.8 3.3 5.2 1.1 3.7 5.2 2.3 0.5 3.9 0.4 2.8
Subtotal (20 countries) 2.8 3.4 5.2 1.1 3.8 5.2 2.3 0.5 3.8 0.3 2.8
Argentina 9.6 5.9 5.8 -2.9 5.5 8.0 3.8 -3.4 -0.8 -4.5 2.6
Bolivia 1.7 4.3 4.8 4.7 4.5 4.9 5.0 0.3 2.3 1.3 3.4
Brazil -0.3 4.5 6.2 4.2 2.5 3.1 0.3 0.9 4.2 1.5 2.7
Chile 10.8 6.9 5.0 9.0 6.9 6.8 3.3 -0.7 4.4 2.8 5.5
Colombia 3.6 4.4 5.9 4.9 1.9 3.3 0.8 -3.8 2.2 1.5 2.5
Costa Rica 8.8 7.1 4.6 3.9 0.8 5.4 8.3 8.0 2.2 1.0 5.0
Cuba -13.8 -16.0 2.0 3.4 8.7 3.3 1.3 6.8 5.3 2.5 0.0
Ecuador 3.0 2.2 4.4 3.0 2.3 3.9 1.0 -7.9 2.3 6.0 1.9
El Salvador 7.3 6.4 6.0 6.2 1.8 4.2 3.8 3.4 2.1 1.9 4.3
Guatemala 4.9 4.0 4.1 5.0 3.0 4.4 5.1 3.9 3.4 1.8 4.0
Haiti -5.5 -8.0 -17.6 9.5 5.6 3.2 2.9 2.9 1.9 -0.7 -0.9
Honduras 5.8 7.1 -1.9 3.7 3.7 4.9 3.3 -1.5 4.8 2.7 3.2
Mexico 3.7 1.8 4.5 -6.2 5.4 6.8 5.0 3.7 6.8 -0.4 3.0
Nicaragua 0.8 -0.4 4.0 4.4 5.1 5.4 4.1 7.4 6.0 3.1 4.0
Panama 8.2 5.3 3.1 1.9 2.7 4.7 4.6 3.5 2.6 0.4 3.7
Paraguay 1.7 4.0 3.0 4.5 1.1 2.4 -0.6 -0.1 -0.6 2.4 1.8
Peru -0.4 4.8 12.7 8.6 2.5 6.8 -0.5 0.9 3.0 0.2 3.8
Dominican Republic 8.0 3.0 4.3 4.7 7.2 8.3 7.3 8.0 7.8 2.7 6.1
Uruguay 8.3 3.5 7.0 -2.3 5.0 5.4 4.4 -2.9 -1.8 -2.9 2.3
Venezuela 7.0 -0.4 -3.7 5.9 -0.4 7.4 0.7 -5.8 3.8 2.8 1.6
Subtotal - Caribbean b 0.7 0.9 3.0 2.7 2.6 2.0 2.7 4.1 4.7 2.3 2.1
Antigua and Barbuda c 0.9 5.0 6.2 -4.8 6.0 5.5 5.0 4.9 2.6 4.3 3.5
Barbados -5.6 1.1 3.1 1.9 2.5 2.6 4.0 3.0 3.1 -2.2 1.3
Belize 9.0 4.3 1.5 3.7 1.3 4.4 2.0 6.0 10.5 4.7 4.7
Dominica 2.3 1.9 1.9 1.2 2.9 2.2 3.1 1.3 0.7 -5.2 1.2
Grenada 1.0 -1.1 3.4 3.1 3.0 4.3 7.6 7.5 6.5 -3.3 3.1
Guyana 9.1 11.4 9.4 3.8 7.4 6.8 -2.2 5.0 -2.3 2.3 5.0
Jamaica 2.7 2.2 1.6 2.2 -0.1 -1.8 -0.8 0.6 1.0 1.8 0.9
Saint Kitts and Nevis 3.2 5.2 5.5 3.2 5.8 7.2 1.1 3.5 5.0 2.0 4.2
Saint Vincent and
the Grenadines 6.9 2.0 -2.3 7.8 1.2 3.5 5.8 3.6 1.8 ... 3.3 c
Saint Lucia 7.5 -1.3 4.6 2.1 0.8 -0.3 3.0 2.8 0.3 -5.0 1.4
Suriname -2.0 -4.1 -0.1 0.0 5.3 3.3 2.9 -3.5 -1.2 ... 0.0 c
Trinidad and Tobago -1.0 -1.2 4.2 4.2 4.4 4.0 5.3 7.8 9.2 4.3 4.1
Source: ECLAC, based on official figures converted into dollars at constant 1995 prices.
a Preliminary figures. b Refers only to those countries that provide data. c The last column refers to the period 1991-2000.
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Table A - 3
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PER CAPITA GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
(Annual growth rates)
1992-
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001a
2001
Latin America and
the Caribbean b 1.0 1.6 3.4 -0.5 2.1 3.5 0.7 -1.1 2.3 -1.1 1.2
Subtotal (20 countries) b 1.0 1.6 3.4 -0.6 2.0 3.5 0.7 -1.1 2.3 -1.2 1.2
Argentina 8.2 4.5 4.4 -4.1 4.1 6.6 2.5 -4.6 -2.0 -5.6 1.3
Bolivia -0.7 1.7 2.3 2.2 2.0 2.4 2.6 -2.0 0.1 -0.9 1.0
Brazil -1.8 3.0 4.7 2.7 1.1 1.7 -1.0 -0.4 2.8 0.2 1.3
Chile 9.0 5.1 3.3 7.3 5.4 5.3 1.9 -2.0 3.1 1.6 4.0
Colombia 1.6 2.4 3.8 2.9 0.0 1.4 -1.1 -5.5 0.4 -0.2 0.5
Costa Rica 5.4 3.8 1.5 1.0 -1.9 2.7 5.6 5.4 0.0 -1.2 2.2
Cuba c -14.4 -16.5 1.4 2.8 8.1 2.9 0.8 6.4 4.9 2.1 -0.5
Ecuador 0.7 -0.1 2.1 0.8 0.2 1.8 -0.9 -9.7 0.4 4.1 -0.1
El Salvador 5.1 4.2 3.7 4.0 -0.3 2.1 1.6 1.3 0.1 0.0 2.2
Guatemala 2.2 1.3 1.4 2.2 0.3 1.7 2.4 1.2 0.7 -0.8 1.3
Haiti -7.2 -9.6 -19.0 7.5 3.7 1.3 1.0 1.1 0.1 -2.5 -2.7
Honduras 2.7 4.0 -4.7 0.7 0.8 2.1 0.5 -4.1 2.1 0.1 0.4
Mexico 1.8 -0.1 2.6 -7.8 3.6 5.1 3.3 2.1 5.2 -1.9 1.3
Nicaragua -2.1 -3.4 0.9 1.5 2.1 2.6 1.4 4.5 3.2 0.4 1.1
Panama 6.2 3.4 1.2 0.1 0.9 3.0 2.9 1.9 1.0 -1.1 1.9
Paraguay -1.1 1.3 0.3 1.8 -1.6 -0.2 -3.2 -2.6 -3.1 -0.1 -0.9
Peru -2.2 2.9 10.8 6.7 0.7 4.9 -2.2 -0.8 1.4 -1.4 2.0
Dominican Republic 6.1 1.2 2.6 2.9 5.3 6.4 5.4 6.1 6.0 1.1 4.3
Uruguay 7.5 2.8 6.2 -3.0 4.2 4.6 3.6 -3.6 -2.5 -3.6 1.6
Venezuela 4.6 -2.7 -5.8 3.7 -2.5 5.2 -1.3 -7.7 1.8 0.9 -0.5
Subtotal - Caribbean b 0.0 0.2 2.2 2.0 1.9 1.2 2.0 3.4 4.0 1.5 2.3
Antigua and Barbuda 0.9 5.0 4.5 -4.8 6.0 5.5 5.0 3.2 2.6 3.7 3.1
Barbados -5.9 0.7 2.3 1.5 2.2 2.2 3.7 2.6 3.1 -2.6 0.9
Belize 6.8 2.7 0.0 1.7 -0.6 1.9 -0.3 3.6 8.5 2.5 2.6
Dominica 2.5 2.0 2.0 1.3 3.0 2.3 3.2 1.4 0.8 -5.2 1.3
Grenada 0.7 -1.4 3.0 2.8 2.7 4.0 7.2 7.2 6.2 -3.7 2.8
Guyana 8.8 11.1 8.8 3.3 7.0 6.2 -2.8 4.6 -2.8 1.8 4.5
Jamaica 1.8 1.3 0.7 1.2 -0.9 -2.5 -1.6 -0.2 0.2 1.0 0.1
Saint Kitts and Nevis 4.1 6.2 6.4 4.1 6.7 8.1 1.9 4.3 5.8 2.0 4.9
Saint Vincent and
the Grenadines 6.2 1.3 -3.0 7.1 0.5 2.8 5.1 2.9 1.2 ... 2.6 c
Saint Lucia 5.9 -2.8 3.9 0.6 0.1 -1.7 2.3 1.4 -1.1 -6.4 0.2
Suriname -2.2 -4.6 -0.4 -0.3 5.0 2.8 2.4 -3.8 -1.7 ... -0.3 c
Trinidad and Tobago -1.8 -2.1 3.3 3.5 3.8 3.4 4.8 7.3 8.8 3.8 3.4
Source: ECLAC, based on official figures converted into dollars at constant 1995 prices.
a Preliminary figures. b Refers only to those countries that provide data. c The last column refers to the period 1991-2000.
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Table A - 4
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN:  FINANCING OF GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION
(As percentages of GDP)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 a
1. Domestic saving 19.3 19.9 20.6 20.5 20.7 19.4 19.4 20.2 18.6
2. Factor income -2.6 -2.4 -2.4 -2.4 -2.4 -2.5 -3.0 -2.8 -2.9
3. Transfers 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.3
4. Gross national saving  (1+2+3) 17.5 18.4 19.1 19.0 19.1 17.8 17.5 18.6 17.0
5. External saving 3.3 3.3 2.3 2.1 3.3 4.4 3.1 2.4 2.7
6. Gross fixed capital formation (4+5) 20.8 21.7 21.4 21.1 22.4 22.2 20.7 21.0 19.7
Source:  ECLAC, based on official figures converted into dollars at current prices.
a Preliminary figures.
Table A - 5
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION
(As percentages of GDP)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001a
Latin America and
the Caribbean 19.2 20.2 19.1 19.3 20.8 21.0 19.7 19.1 18.5
Argentina 18.6 20.0 17.9 18.5 20.1 20.7 18.7 17.6 15.5
Bolivia 16.3 14.3 15.5 16.6 20.2 24.7 20.9 18.7 14.6
Brazil 18.6 20.0 20.5 20.3 21.5 21.2 19.9 18.1 18.1
Chile 21.9 22.2 25.2 25.6 26.6 26.2 21.5 22.3 22.1
Colombia 20.2 23.3 22.4 21.7 20.5 19.9 12.7 13.9 15.0
Costa Rica 19.6 19.2 19.0 17.3 18.8 21.7 19.3 18.4 18.9
Cuba 10.8 7.5 7.8 9.7 9.7 10.0 9.9 9.6 9.5
Ecuador 18.6 18.5 18.6 18.4 18.4 19.4 13.8 14.8 19.2
El Salvador 16.6 17.6 18.7 16.3 16.9 17.9 17.1 17.5 17.3
Guatemala 15.0 14.1 14.5 13.7 16.2 18.5 18.8 17.0 16.9
Haiti 16.2 12.8 26.1 27.6 28.8 27.1 32.6 37.9 35.6
Honduras 28.5 29.0 24.0 24.6 27.1 29.0 31.5 27.9 25.3
Mexico 20.8 21.6 16.2 17.9 20.5 21.2 22.0 23.0 21.7
Nicaragua 19.9 22.1 23.9 24.7 28.0 30.1 39.0 32.9 30.9
Panama 24.0 24.6 26.0 24.6 24.7 27.3 32.2 29.0 …
Paraguay 22.1 22.4 23.1 22.8 22.0 21.1 20.3 20.3 15.9
Peru 18.1 21.5 24.1 22.8 24.6 24.4 21.5 19.9 18.1
Dominican Republic 25.9 24.1 21.7 21.6 23.9 29.1 30.0 29.9 29.6
Uruguay 14.1 14.0 13.5 14.0 14.5 15.0 14.5 13.1 11.8
Venezuela 20.2 17.1 16.5 15.3 18.0 17.3 15.4 15.0 16.3
Source: ECLAC, based on official figures converted into dollars at constant 1995 prices.
a Preliminary figures.
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Table A - 6
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: URBAN UNEMPLOYMENT
(Average annual rates)
1980 1985 1990 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 a
Latin America and
the Caribbean b 6.1 7.3 5.8 6.6 6.6 7.5 8.0 7.6 8.1 8.9 8.4 8.4
Simple average (22 countries) ... ... ... 10.0 9.5 10.1 10.5 9.9 9.7 10.3c 10.1c 10.3 c
Argentina
  Urban areas d 2.6 6.1 7.4 9.6 11.5 17.5 17.2 14.9 12.9 14.3 15.1 17.4
Barbados
  Nationwide total e ... ... 14.7 24.3 21.9 19.7 15.6 14.5 12.3 10.4 9.2 9.9
Bolivia
  Departmental capitals f ... 5.8 7.3 5.8 3.1 3.6 3.8 4.4 6.1 8.0 7.5 8.5
Brazil
  Six metropolitan areas 6.3 5.3 4.3 5.4 5.1 4.6 5.4 5.7 7.6 7.6 7.1 6.2
Chile
  Nationwide total g 10.4 15.3 7.8 6.5 7.8 7.4 6.4 6.1 6.4 9.8 9.2 9.1
Colombia e
  Seven metropolitan areas h 10.0 13.9 10.5 8.6 8.9 8.8 11.2 12.4 15.3 19.4 17.2 18.2
Costa Rica
  Total urban areas 6.0 6.7 5.4 4.0 4.3 5.7 6.6 5.9 5.4 6.2 5.3 5.8
Cuba
  Nationwide total ... ... ... 6.2 6.7 7.9 7.6 7.0 6.6 6.0 5.5 4.1
Ecuador e
  Total urban areas i 5.7 10.4 6.1 8.9 7.8 7.7 10.4 9.3 11.5 15.1 14.1 10.4
El Salvador
  Total urban areas ... ... 10.0 8.1 7.0 7.0 7.5 7.5 7.6 6.9 6.5 7.0
Guatemala j
  Nationwide total 2.2 12.1 6.3 2.6 3.5 3.9 5.2 5.1 3.8 ... ... …
Honduras
  Total urban areas 8.8 11.7 7.8 7.0 4.0 5.6 6.5 5.8 5.2 5.3 ... 6.3
Jamaica e
  Nationwide total ... ... 15.3 16.3 15.4 16.2 16.0 16.5 15.5 15.7 15.5 15.0
Mexico
   Urban areas d 4.5 4.4 2.7 3.4 3.7 6.2 5.5 3.7 3.2 2.5 2.2 2.5
Nicaragua j
  Nationwide total ... 3.2 7.6 17.8 17.1 16.9 16.0 14.3 13.2 10.7 9.8 10.7
Panama e
  Metropolitan region f 9.9 15.6 20.0 15.6 16.0 16.6 16.9 15.5 15.2 14.0 15.2 16.9
Paraguay
   Total urban areas k 4.1 5.2 6.6 5.1 4.4 5.3 8.2 7.1 6.6 9.4 10.0 10.8
Peru
  Lima metropolitan area 7.1 10.1 8.3 9.9 8.8 8.2 8.0 9.2 8.5 9.2 8.5 9.3
Dominican Republic e
  Nationwide total ... ... ... 19.9 16.0 15.8 16.5 15.9 14.3 13.8 13.9 15.6
Trinidad and Tobago
  Nationwide total e ... ... 20.1 19.8 18.4 17.2 16.2 15.0 14.2 13.1 12.8 11.1
Uruguay
   Total urban areas l 7.4 13.1 8.5 8.3 9.2 10.3 11.9 11.5 10.1 11.3 13.6 15.3
Venezuela
  Nationwide total 6.0 13.1 10.4 6.6 8.7 10.3 11.8 11.4 11.3 14.9 14.0 13.4
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
a Preliminary figures. b Does not include the Caribbean until 1990. c  Figures adjusted to compensate for lack of data. d Represents a large
and growing number of urban areas. e Includes hidden unemployment. f  From 2000 on, total urban areas. g The figure shown for 1985
actually corresponds to 1984. h From 2000 on, 13 cities. i From 1999 on, Cuenca, Guayaquil and Quito. j Official estimates. k Until 1993,
the figures given correspond to the Asunción metropolitan area. l The figure shown for 1980 and 1985 correspond to Montevideo.
42 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
Table A - 7
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: CONSUMER PRICES
(December-to-December percentage variations)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001a
Latin America and
the Caribbean  872.4  328.7  26.0  18.6  10.7  10.0  9.7  9.0  6.1
Argentina  7.4  3.9  1.6  0.1  0.3  0.7 - 1.8 - 0.7 - 1.5
Barbados - 1.0  2.1  2.8  1.8  3.6  1.7  2.9  3.8 - 1.2
Bolivia  9.3  8.5  10.6  9.9  6.7  4.4  3.1  3.4  0.9
Brazil 2 477.2  916.5  22.4  9.6  5.2  1.7  8.9  6.0  7.7
Chile  12.2  8.9  8.2  6.6  6.0  4.7  2.3  4.5  2.6
Colombia  22.6  22.6  19.5  21.6  17.7  16.7  9.1  8.8  7.7
Costa Rica  9.0  19.9  22.6  13.9  11.2  12.4  10.0  10.3  11.0
Ecuador  31.0  25.3  22.8  25.6  30.6  43.4  60.7  91.0  22.4
El Salvador  12.1  8.9  11.4  7.4  1.9  4.2 - 1.0  4.3  1.4
Guatemala  11.6  11.6  8.6  10.9  7.1  7.5  4.9  5.1  9.1b
Haiti  44.4  32.2  24.8  14.7  15.6  7.4  9.7  19.0  8.2c
Honduras  13.0  28.9  26.8  25.3  12.8  15.7  10.9  10.0  8.8
Jamaica  30.1  26.9  25.5  15.8  9.2  7.9  7.0  6.1  8.7c
Mexico  8.0  7.1  52.1  27.7  15.7  18.6  12.3  9.0  4.4
Nicaragua  19.5  12.4  10.9  12.1  7.3  18.5  7.2  9.9  4.7b
Panama  0.9  1.4  0.8  2.3 - 0.5  1.4  1.5  0.7 - 0.1b
Paraguay  20.4  18.3  10.5  8.2  6.2  14.6  5.4  8.6  8.4
Peru  39.5  15.4  10.2  11.8  6.5  6.0  3.8  3.8 - 0.1
Dominican Republic  2.8  14.3  9.2  4.0  8.4  7.8  5.1  9.1  4.4
Trinidad and Tobago  13.4  5.5  3.8  4.3  3.5  5.6  3.4  5.6  3.2c
Uruguay  52.9  44.1  35.4  24.3  15.2  8.7  4.2  5.1  3.6
Venezuela  45.9  70.8  56.6  103.2  37.6  29.9  20.1  13.4  12.3
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures provided by public institutions in the respective countries.
a Variation between July 2001 and June 2002. b Variation between June 2001 and May 2002. c Variation between May 2001 and April 2002.
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Table A - 8
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF GOODS, FOB a
(Rate of variation in index, 1995=100)
Exports b Imports b
Value Unit Volume Value Unit Volume
value value
1990 10.2 4.4 5.5 12.9 3.7 9.0
1991 0.7 -3.2 4.0 17.7 -4.0 22.6
1992 8.0 0.6 7.4 22.8 1.3 21.2
1993 10.1 -2.3 12.7 11.8 -1.8 13.9
1994 16.0 6.6 8.9 18.7 1.5 16.9
1995 21.2 8.3 11.8 12.2 7.1 4.8
1996 12.1 0.4 11.7 11.4 -0.4 11.8
1997 11.2 -0.9 12.2 18.4 -2.8 21.9
1998 -1.1 -8.7 8.4 6.2 -3.4 9.9
1999 5.7 -1.1 6.9 -3.8 -1.5 -2.4
2000 19.8 8.1 10.8 16.1 2.1 13.7
2001 c -3.9 -7.3 3.7 -2.5 -3.2 0.8
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from official sources and the International Monetary Fund.
a Includes 17 Spanish-speaking countries, plus Brazil and Haiti. b The indices shown here for value, unit value and volume do not necessarily
coincide with indices for these variables calculated on the basis of national accounts, due to differences in methodologies and coverage. c Preliminary
figures.
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Table A - 9
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: EXPORTS OF GOODS, FOB
(Indices 1995 = 100)
Value Unit value Volume
1999 2000 2001a 1999 2000 2001a 1999 2000 2001a
Latin America and
the Caribbean 130.3 156.1 150.0 89.8 97.1 90.0 145.1 160.7 166.6
Argentina 110.1 124.8 126.0 82.9 91.6 88.4 132.9 136.2 142.5
Bolivia 100.9 119.7 123.4 95.3 99.1 94.5 105.9 120.7 130.6
Brazil 103.2 118.4 125.2 84.0 85.6 83.0 122.9 138.4 150.8
Chile 107.3 120.1 115.5 64.5 71.0 63.5 166.4 169.2 181.9
Colombia 113.6 128.6 120.4 95.6 109.0 99.7 118.9 117.9 120.8
Costa Rica 189.9 166.9 141.7 92.5 87.9 83.4 205.3 189.9 169.9
Ecuador 102.7 114.7 106.6 95.9 115.1 102.8 107.1 99.7 103.7
El Salvador 153.4 179.4 175.6 92.9 92.0 86.5 165.1 195.0 203.0
Guatemala 128.9 142.9 138.1 78.9 79.7 73.3 163.4 179.2 188.4
Haiti 222.1 207.0 192.0 99.0 97.0 94.6 224.4 213.5 203.0
Honduras 120.3 137.0 136.5 96.1 95.1 89.9 125.2 144.1 151.9
Mexico 171.5 209.3 199.3 96.9 101.7 95.0 177.0 205.8 209.8
Nicaragua 125.7 147.5 137.6 84.6 86.3 76.7 148.6 171.0 179.4
Panama 87.1 95.8 97.1 104.8 103.8 100.7 83.1 92.3 96.5
Paraguay 54.8 55.4 55.8 91.8 90.8 87.7 59.7 61.0 63.6
Peru 109.4 125.8 127.0 74.1 75.6 69.6 147.6 166.3 182.5
Dominican Republic 135.9 151.8 141.1 93.9 94.6 92.7 144.7 160.4 152.2
Uruguay 106.7 111.0 99.8 84.5 82.1 79.6 126.2 135.2 125.4
Venezuela 109.1 173.1 141.8 95.9 141.0 114.8 113.8 122.8 123.5
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the International Monetary Fund and national sources.
a Preliminary figures.
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Table A - 10
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: IMPORTS OF GOODS, FOB
(Indices 1995 = 100)
Value Unit value Volume
1999 2000 2000a 1999 2000 2000a 1999 2000 2001a
Latin America and
the Caribbean 134.6 156.3 152.4 92.1 94.0 91.0 146.2 166.2 167.6
Argentina 128.2 126.8 101.8 84.2 84.2 81.7 152.2 150.6 124.6
Bolivia 125.8 129.5 122.1 86.8 88.5 85.5 144.9 146.4 142.8
Brazil 99.3 112.4 111.9 89.7 94.2 91.5 110.7 119.3 122.3
Chile 100.6 116.7 112.1 87.7 96.5 92.7 114.7 121.0 120.9
Colombia 78.1 84.4 93.4 93.2 94.1 91.3 83.8 89.7 102.3
Costa Rica 157.6 158.3 149.7 90.0 91.8 88.3 175.1 172.5 169.5
Ecuador 65.6 81.7 117.3 90.3 93.0 90.0 72.7 87.9 130.3
El Salvador 124.9 151.0 154.5 106.9 111.2 107.9 116.8 135.8 143.2
Guatemala 137.9 156.4 160.3 90.5 94.1 90.3 152.3 166.2 177.5
Haiti 143.9 155.8 151.5 103.9 110.1 105.7 138.5 141.5 143.3
Honduras 159.7 169.9 179.1 87.2 91.6 87.2 183.2 185.5 205.4
Mexico 196.0 240.8 232.3 94.7 94.7 91.4 206.9 254.3 254.1
Nicaragua 192.7 186.9 184.8 104.3 111.6 108.2 184.8 167.5 170.8
Panama 100.1 105.2 100.9 99.0 104.0 100.4 101.2 101.1 100.5
Paraguay 61.3 64.7 64.2 104.7 107.8 104.2 58.6 60.0 61.7
Peru 86.8 94.8 92.9 89.0 93.5 89.8 97.5 101.4 103.4
Dominican Republic 155.5 183.3 169.9 90.3 92.7 89.5 172.2 197.8 189.8
Uruguay 117.5 122.2 107.4 89.0 95.2 91.4 132.1 128.3 117.5
Venezuela 109.5 128.4 143.2 89.6 89.6 87.1 122.2 143.3 164.4
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the International Monetary Fund and national sources.
a Preliminary figures.
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Table A - 11
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TERMS OF TRADE FOR GOODS, FOB/FOB
(Indices 1995 = 100)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001a
Latin America and
the Caribbean 94.1 98.8 100.0 100.8 102.8 97.1 97.5 103.3 99.0
Argentina 104.8 105.6 100.0 108.5 108.9 103.9 98.5 108.8 108.2
Bolivia 88.3 102.5 100.0 111.7 115.6 109.9 109.8 112.0 110.5
Brazil 79.9 91.5 100.0 98.0 103.8 103.8 93.6 90.9 90.7
Chile 74.2 84.1 100.0 80.7 83.0 73.3 73.5 73.6 68.5
Colombia 91.0 104.9 100.0 103.8 104.4 95.8 102.6 115.8 109.2
Costa Rica 84.5 93.9 100.0 94.9 100.6 103.9 102.8 95.8 94.5
Ecuador 106.4 108.9 100.0 109.6 111.9 99.6 106.2 123.8 114.2
El Salvador 63.7 81.0 100.0 93.6 94.1 91.7 86.9 82.7 80.2
Guatemala 84.3 89.9 100.0 87.7 94.8 94.3 87.2 84.7 81.2
Haiti 94.1 96.8 100.0 90.6 94.8 96.7 95.3 88.1 89.5
Honduras 90.3 92.1 100.0 92.8 115.4 118.0 110.2 103.8 103.1
Mexico 104.9 103.3 100.0 102.8 104.0 100.4 102.3 107.4 103.9
Nicaragua 81.3 95.5 100.0 88.1 83.9 87.4 81.1 77.3 70.9
Panama 106.8 110.1 100.0 101.3 103.4 103.3 105.9 99.8 100.3
Paraguay 87.2 105.1 100.0 100.0 99.9 92.4 87.7 84.2 84.2
Peru 89.1 95.7 100.0 96.5 103.2 89.7 83.3 80.9 77.5
Dominican Republic 90.7 95.6 100.0 97.7 102.0 103.1 104.0 102.0 103.6
Uruguay 94.6 94.7 100.0 96.7 96.4 103.1 94.9 86.2 87.1
Venezuela 100.9 100.0 100.0 115.6 110.8 79.9 107.0 157.4 131.8
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the International Monetary Fund and national sources.
a Preliminary figures.
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Table A - 12
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
(Percentages of GDP)  a
Trade balance Balance on Balance on capital
Overall balance
(goods and services) current account and financial account b
2000 2001c 2000 2001c 2000 2001c 2000 2001c
Latin America and
the Caribbean -0.7 -1.0 -2.4 -2.7 3.5 1.7 0.8 -1.0
Argentina -0.6 1.2 -3.1 -1.6 2.7 -6.0 -0.4 -7.5
Bolivia -7.3 -5.7 -5.4 -3.5 4.9 3.1 -0.5 -0.4
Brazil -1.4 -0.9 -4.1 -3.9 6.2 3.7 1.4 -0.6
Chile 1.8 1.6 -1.5 -1.8 2.1 1.0 0.5 -0.8
Colombia 1.5 -1.0 0.4 -2.0 0.6 3.4 1.0 1.5
Costa Rica 2.6 -0.4 -4.8 -4.7 3.8 4.9 -1.0 0.1
Ecuador 7.3 -8.0 6.8 -5.7 -48.5 4.0 -41.9 -1.7
El Salvador -15.3 -14.8 -3.3 -1.4 3.1 0.0 -0.4 -1.4
Guatemala -9.0 -10.2 -5.5 -5.8 9.3 8.7 3.4 2.5
Haiti -20.0 -20.1 -2.1 -1.4 1.0 1.4 -1.2 0.0
Honduras -14.4 -17.7 -4.3 -5.5 3.5 6.3 -1.1 0.3
Mexico -1.8 -2.3 -3.1 -3.0 5.2 5.2 1.2 1.3
Nicaragua -43.2 -44.7 -38.3 -40.9 32.4 32.3 -8.3 -11.1
Panama -5.0 -1.5 -9.4 -5.0 6.3 2.1 -3.3 -3.0
Paraguay -5.4 -4.9 -2.5 -2.9 -1.9 2.1 -4.5 -0.8
Peru -2.0 -1.5 -3.0 -2.0 2.9 2.9 -0.2 0.8
Dominican Republic -9.5 -8.8 -5.2 -4.2 5.6 7.8 -0.2 2.6
Uruguay -2.6 -2.0 -2.7 -2.4 3.4 3.7 0.8 1.5
Venezuela 12.1 5.4 10.9 3.6 -7.1 -6.2 4.8 -1.7
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the International Monetary Fund and official sources.
a Estimates based on figures expressed in dollars at current prices. b Includes errors and omissions.  c Preliminary figures.
48 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
Table A - 13
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: GROSS DISBURSED EXTERNAL DEBT a
(Millions of dollars)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001b
Latin America and
the Caribbean 528 037 564 399 619 233 641 305 666 482 747 583 763 197 740 202 725 671
Argentina 72 209 85 656 98 547 110 613 125 052 141 929 145 289 146 338 139 783
Bolivia c 3 784 3 777 4 216 4 523 4 366 4 234 4 390 4 327 4 240
Brazil 145 726 148 295 159 256 179 935 199 998 241 644 241 468 236 157 226 036
Chile 19 665 21 768 21 736 22 979 26 701 31 691 34 167 36 849 37 790
Colombia 18 908 21 855 26 341 31 116 34 412 36 606 36 662 36 394 39 885
Costa Rica 4 011 4 133 4 209 3 289 3 086 3 402 3 641 3 748 3 800
Cuba 8 785 9 083 10 504 10 465 10 146 11 209 11 078 10 961 11 100
Ecuador 13 631 14 589 13 934 14 586 15 099 16 400 16 282 13 564 14 411
El Salvador c 1 976 2 056 2 168 2 517 2 689 2 632 2 789 2 832 3 148
Guatemala 2 347 2 895 2 947 3 026 3 197 3 618 3 831 3 929 4 100
Guyana 2 062 2 004 2 058 1 537 1 514 1 500 1 196 1 250 1 250
Haiti c 866 875 898 914 1 025 1 100 1 166 1 180 1 189
Honduras 3 850 4 040 4 243 4 121 4 073 4 404 4 729 4 721 4 802
Jamaica 3 687 3 652 3 452 3 232 3 278 3 300 3 050 3 200 3 200
Mexico d 130 500 139 800 165 600 157 200 149 028 160 258 166 381 148 652 144 534
Nicaragua c 10 987 11 695 10 248 6 094 6 001 6 287 6 549 6 660 6 374
Panama c 5 264 5 505 5 891 5 070 5 051 5 349 5 568 5 604 6 263
Paraguay 1 254 1 271 1 741 1 801 1 927 2 133 2 697 2 701 2 586
Peru 27 447 30 191 33 378 33 805 28 642 29 477 28 704 28 353 27 653
Dominican Republic 4 562 3 946 3 999 3 807 3 572 3 537 3 636 3 685 4 137
Trinidad and Tobago 2 102 2 064 1 905 1 876 1 541 1 430 1 511 1 550 1 550
Uruguay c 3 578 4 251 4 426 4 682 4 754 5 195 5 178 5 492 5 611
Venezuela 40 836 40 998 37 537 34 117 31 328 30 248 33 235 32 056 32 229
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
a Includes debt owed to the International Monetary Fund.  b Preliminary figures. cExternal public debt. d Public debt does not include investment
by non-residents in government securities.
